State of Utah v. Woodrow Willie John : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
State of Utah v. Woodrow Willie John : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn R. Brown; Attorney for Appellant;
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. John, No. 18108 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2733
IN THF. SUPREME COTJ~'!' OF THP. STATF. OF UTAH 
RTATF. OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-










Case No. l~lOR 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a conviction of Attempted Rape, a third-
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender As.soc. 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
OAVID r..... WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. OORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT A4114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FILED 
APR Z ' 13t.3 
r r ro g 
Q I ailiiic9e••..._HilY•1iH~ 
Clwi. Supreme Court, Utatl 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THF. SUPREME COTJ~T OF THP. STATF, OF UTAH 
~TATF. OF UTAH , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-











Case No. l~lnR 
BRIEF OF RESPONnBNT 
Appeal from a conviction of Attempted Rape, a third-
degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT A4111 
Attorney for Appellant 
nAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. OORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT A4114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE • • • • • • • • • • 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. • • • • • • • • • • • • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROPER 
PROCEDURES FOR OBJECTING TO RUTH ROBINSON'S 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY PRECLUDES CONSIDERA-
TION ON APPEAL OF HIS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
RESPECTING THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO STRIKE 






PROPERLY REFUSED TO STRIKE THAT TESTIMONY. • 4 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 
CONCLUSION. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 20 
Cases Cited 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)........ 12 
Foss v. State, 92 Nev. 163, 547 P.2d 688 (1976) •••• 10,11 
Nardone v. United States, 308 u.s. 338 (1939) • ·"· • • 5,7 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). • • • • • • • • • 5,14 
15,17 
People v. Superior ·court [Edmonds], 4 Cal. 3d 605, 94 
Cal. Rptr. 250, 483 P.2d 1202 (1971). • • • • 8 
People v. Takencareof, 119 Cal. App. 3d 492, 174 Cal. 
~, Rptr. 112 ( 19 81 ) • • • • • • • · • • • • • • • • 5, 8 
Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927). • • • • 5 
Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 377 (1968) • • • • • 12 














Allman, 19 Wash. App. 169, 573 P.2d 1329 (1977) 5 
Clemens, Utah, 580 ~.2d 601 (1978) •••••• 16,17 
19 
Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 455 P.2d 731 (1968) •• 10,11 
Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982) •••••• 19,20 
Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) • • • • • 8,9 
11,17,18 
Mccumber, Utah, 622 P. 2d 353 ( 1980). • • • •• 12-15 
17 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Page 
Cases Cited 
State v. Nevarez, 108 Ariz. 414, 499 P.2d 709 (1972). 10,11 
State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977) cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978) • • • • • • • • 10 
State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965) • 9 
State v. Sterling, Or. App., 537 P.2d 578 (1975). • • 10 
Temple v. State, Okl. Cr., 568 P.2d 1321 (1977) • • • 10 
United States v. Tisdale, 647 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1981) 5 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann., s 76-5-402 (1953), as amended • • • • 1 
" 
n 
" s 76-5-404 n " n 1 • • • • 
" 
n n s 77-8-1 to 4 " " n 16 • • • • 
" 
n 
" s 77-35-12 II " n 6,11 • • • • 
n 
" 
n s 77-35-12(b) ( 2) " " 6,7 • • • • 
" 
II 
" s 77-35-12 ( d) " n 6,7 • • • • 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4. • • • • • • • • • • • 8 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 






• Case No. 18108 
WOODROW WILLIE JOHN, • • 
Defendant-Appellant. • • 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Woodrow Willie John, was charged with 
Attempted Rape, a third-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann., 
S 76-5-402 (1953), as amended; and with Forcible Sexual Abuse, 
a third-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-404 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of attempted rape after a 
jury trial on October 14 and 15, 1981 in the Third Judicial 
• District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. On October 26, 
1981, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
~~~ ~~~~~~~e of the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 9, 1981, it was hot and sunny in Salt Lake 
City. At approximately 4 p.m. that day, Ruth Robinson 
returned from work to her car parked in a lot located near 200 
West and South Temple (T. 9, 10). Shortly after Ms. Robinson 
entered her vehicle, appellant opened the door on the driver's 
side and slid into the front seat, pushing Ms. Robinson out 
from behind the steering wheel (T. 12, 13). When Ms. Robinson 
grabbed the car's horn and began screaming, appellant placed 
his hands over her mouth and forced her to lie down on the . 
seat, his body on top of hers (T. 14, 15). Appellant 
attempted to kiss Ms. Robinson, unbuttoned her blouse to 
fondle her breasts, and rubbed his leg up and down inside of 
he rs ( T. 16, 1 7) • 
Although Ms. Robinson kicked and screamed, struck 
appellant in the face and chest, and repeatedly tried to honk 
the car's horn, appellant proceeded to remove her clothing, 
saying to her "I got to do it, lady; I got to do it" (T. 18). 
Appellant "roll [ed] all over" Ms. Robinson, fondling her 
female organs and repeating the phrase "I got to do it, lady" 
4 
(T. 19, 20). 
Samuel Lee was in the parking lot at the time Ms. 
Robinson was accosted (T. 51). Alerted by Ms. Robinson's 
screaming, he approached her car in time to observe appellant 
positioned on top of her (T. 52, 54). Once appellant noticed 
Lee, he backed out o'f the car and ran from the scene ( T. 22, 
SS, 56). 
-2-
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Carlin Jacobson and his wife were also in the 
parking lot at the time of appellant's attack (T. 68, 69). 
Having been informed by Mr. Lee that appellant had tried to 
rape Ms. Robinson, Mr. Jacobson ran after appellant, who was 
then fleeing the area (T. 71). He finally caught up with 
appellant as appellant drove away in a truck (T. 73). 
Although he failed to apprehend appellant, Mr. Jacobson did 
get a good look at appellant from a distance of approximately 
three feet, and managed to observe the truck's license plate 
number which was then relayed to the police (T. 74, 75). 
That same day law enforcement officers located 
appellant-~who fit the description they had of Ms. Robinson's 
assailant (T. 88)--at the Prison Diagnostic Centerl at 302 
West 800 North in Salt Lake City (T. 85). Less than one hour 
after the attack and after telling police that her assailant 
was an Indian wearing a red shirt, Ms. Robinson accompanied 
police to the Diagnostic Center in order to view the appellant 
(T. 23, 39, 40). At the Center, she positively identified 
appellant as the man who had attacked her after first seeing 
him from the patrol car at a distance of approximately twenty 
feet and then viewing him inside the building at a distance of 
approximately four feet and hearing him say "lady" as he had 
during the attack (T. 26, 27, 28, 481 91).2 
lThe Diagnostic Center is referred to as the St. 
Mark's Halfway House in appellant's brief. 
21t is not particularly clear from the record at 
what point during their meeting at the Diagnostic Center 
-3-
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At trial, Ms. Robinson identified appellant as her 
assailant; Samuel Lee identified appellant as the person he 
had seen accosting Ms. Robinson in her car; and Carlin 
Jacobson identified appellant as the man he chased around the 
area that day after Mr. Lee had pointed him out as the man who 
had attempted to rape Ms. Robinson (T. 12, 26, 53, 72). Ms. 
Robinson also identified pictures of scratches on appellant's 
chin and neck (scratches noticed by Officer Barraclough, the 
Salt Lake City police officer who took appellant into custody 
at the Diagnostic Center (T. 89)) as those she had inflicted 
on appellant while the crime was in progress (T. 29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROPER 
PROCEDURES FOR OBJECTING TO RUTH 
ROBINSON'S IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
PRECLUDES CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL OF HIS 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR RESPECTING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO STRIKE THAT TESTIMONY; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO STRIKE THAT TESTIMONY. 
Ms. Robinson became certain that appellant was her assailant. 
Ms4: Robinson's testimony and that of Nolan Barraclough, a Salt 
Lake City police officer present at the Diagnostic Center at 
the time of the meeting, appear to be somewhat inconsistent on 
this point. However, whether Ms. Robinson positively 
identified appellant before or after she heard him say "lady" 
is not critical (Appellant's Brief makes light of the 
possibility that Ms. Robinson was unable to make a positive 
identification until after appellant uttered the word "lady"). 
The important fact is that she positively identified appellant 
at the Diagnostic Center. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Relying on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 1R8 (1972), and 
a number of law journal articles which purportedly establish 
the highly unreliable nature of eyewitness identification, 
appellant argues that Ruth Robinson's testimony concerning her 
identification at a show-up of appellant as her assailant was 
so unreliable that it should have been stricken by the trial 
court. Specifically, appellant challenges the admissibility 
of that testimony on the ground that the show-up procedure 
used by the police was impermissibly suggestive. However, 
appellant's failure to follow the proper procedures for 
objecting to admission of the challenged testimony precludes 
consideration of his assignment of error on appeal. 
It is well established that a defendant has a duty 
to present challenges to the admissibility of evidence before 
trial when that is possible, and that unless good cause is 
shown, the failure to assume this ohligation constitutes a 
waiver. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); 
Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927); United States 
v. Tisdale, 647 F.2d 91 (10th Cir. 1981); People v. 
Takencareof, 119 Cal. App. 3d 492, 174 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1981). 
' 
Thus, the proper time to raise objections to the propriety of 
identification procedures, which a defendant believes affects 
the admissibility of anticipated identification testimony, is 
-
before trial. State v. Allman, 19 Wash. App. 169, 573 P.2d 
1329 (1977). Appellant's challenge to the ·propriety of the 
-5-
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show-up procedure used in this case (i.e., taking the victim, 
Ms. Robinson, to the Diagnostic Center to have her view 
appellant and determine whether he was her assailant) should 
have been presented to the trial court in a pre-trial motion 
to suppress under Utah Code Ann., S 77-35-12 (1953), as 
amended. Subsection (b) of that statute provides: 
Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is 
capable of determination without the trial 
on the general issue may be raised prior -
to trial by written motion. The following 
shall be raised at leat five days prior to 
trial: 
• • • (2) Motions concerning the admissibility 
of evidence. 
Subsection (d) further provides: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at 
the time set by the court shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but the court for cause 
shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
Section 77-35-12(b)(2) explicitly states that 
motions concerning the admissibility of evidence "shall" be 
raised before trial. The provision is mandatory. Section 
77-35-12(d) makes clear that failure to make mandatory pre-
• 
' 
trial motions--of which a motion concerning admissibility of 
eviaence is one--results in a waiver, with the proviso that 
relief from waiver may be granted for cause shown. The 
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effects of objections to the admissibility of evidence during 
the trial phase by requiring that those objections be 
presented and ruled upon before trial when possible. The 
importance of eliminating those disruptive effects was 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Nardone v. 
United States, supra, at 341-342: 
Dispatch in the trial of criminal 
causes is essential in bringing crime to 
book. Therefore, timely steps must be 
taken to secure judicial determination of 
claims of illegality on the part of agents 
of the G~vernment in obtaining testimony. 
To interrupt the course of the trial for 
such auxiliary inquiries impedes the 
momentum of the main proceeding and breaks 
the continuity of the jury's attention. 
• • • 
The admissibility of Ruth Robinson's identification 
testimony was capable of determination before trial, and any 
objections to it should have been timely raised in a pre-trial 
motion to suppress as required by S 77-35-12(b)(2). Since 
appellant has not shown cause for his failure to follow the 
required procedure, under § 77-35-12(d) he has waived the 
right to complain of any error concerning the admission of 
RoQinson's testimony. Strict adherence to the waiver 
provisions in subsection (d) is necessary if the obvious 
purpose of Rule 12 (discussed above) is not to be defeated. 
The California Supreme Court, for example, has recognized the 
importance of strictly applying the waiver provisions of a 
-7-
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similar rule containea in that state's code of criminal 
procedure. See People v. Takencareof, supra, citing People v. 
Superior Court [Enmonds], 4 Cal. 3d 605, 94 Cal. Rptr. 250, 
483 P.2d 1202 (1971). 
Furthermore, appellant failed timely to object to 
Ms. Robinson's testimony at trial. He made no ohjection to it 
as it was being given (see T. 9-50). It was not until the day 
after the testimony was given and after the State had rested 
its case that appellant made a motion to strike the testimony 
(see T. 101). 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be 
set aside, nor shall the judgment or 
decision based thereon be reversed, by 
reason of the erroneous admission of 
evidence unless (a) there appears of 
record objection to the evidence timely 
interposed and so stated as to make clear 
the specific ground of objection, and (b) 
the court which passes upon the effect of 
the error or errors is of the opinion that 
the admitted evidence should have been 
excluded on the ground stated and probably 
had a substantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict or finding. However, 
the court in its discretion, and in the 
interests of justice, may review the 
erroneous admission of evidence even 
44 though the grounds of the objection 
thereto are not correctly stated. 
Recently, in State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 
(1982), this Court made clear what effect a defendant's 
failure to comply with the "contemporaneous objection" 
requirements of Rule 4 would have on assignments of error made 
-8-
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on appeal. In holding that McCardell's failure to interpose a 
timely and specific objection to the admission of several "mug 
shots" precluded consideration on appeal of his arguments 
respecting that issue (even though his "arguments on [that] 
point clearly ha[d] merit," 652 P.2d at 946), the Court said: 
We endorse the following statement made by 
the Kansas Supreme Court in [State v. 
Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923 (1975)]: 
"The contemporaneous objection rule long 
adhered to in this state requires timely 
and specific objection to admission of 
evidence in order for the question of 
admissibility to be considered on appeal. 
The rule is a salutary procedural tool 
serving a legitimate state purpose. By 
making use of the rule, counsel gives the 
·trial court the opportunity to conduct the 
trial without using the tainted evidence, 
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new 
trial. Furthermore, the rule is 
practically one of necessity if litigation 
is ever to be brought to an end." 
543 P.2d at 927, quoting Baker v. State, 
204 Kan. 607, 611, 464 P.2d 212, 2l6 
( 19 70) • 
652 P.2d at 947. See also: State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 
401 P.2d 445 (1965). The same considerations apply here. 
Thus, appellant's failure to interpose a timely objection, 
whtch thereby denied the trial court an opportunity to address 
his concerns, should have the same consequences such 
inexcusable procedural default had in State v. Mccardell, 
supra--a refusal by this Cou~t to consider any assignment of 
error on appeal. 
-9-
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As noted in State v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 
(1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978), 
• • • in order to preserve a question for 
appellate review on alleged error by the 
trial court, generally a party must object 
to improper questions and inadmissible 
evidence at his earliest opportunity. 
Id. at 1353. Clearly, appellant did not object to the 
challenged testimony at his earliest opportunity. It was 
three witnesses and a day later that he made his motion to 
strike. That does not constitute a timely objection. See 
State v. Sterling, Or. App., 537 P.2d 578, 579 (1975), where 
the court said that defendant's motion to strike testimony 
offered a .cay earlier and received without objection came too 
late; and Temple v. State, Okl. Cr., 568 P.2d 1321, 1322 
( 1977), which said that where "defendant's counsel failed to 
object to the admission of any evidence as it was presented, 
but instead waited until the State rested its case," that was 
not a timely objection. 
It is generally accepted that denial of a motion to 
strike certain evidence is proper where the defendant failed 
to object to the evidence at the time it was offered. See 
• 
Foss v. State, 92 Nev. 163, 547 P.2d 688 (1976); State v. 
Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 455 P.2d 731 (1968). As previously 
noted, appellant did not object at the time Ms. Robinson's 
·-ide nt if ica t ion testimony was-given, although he had ample 
opportunity to do so. In State v. Nevarez, 108 Ariz. 414, 499 
-10-
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P.2d 709 (1972), the Arizona Supreme Court addressed a 
situation very similar to that presented in the instant case 
as follows: 
At the time of trial, [the witness] 
identified the defendant before the jury 
and there was no objection by defense 
counsel, and there was no objection 
interposed when pictures of the defendant 
were identified by [the witness] and 
admitted in evidence. It was not until 
the State's case was completed that 
defendant raised an objection to the 
identification of the defendant and asked 
that [the witness's] testimony be 
stricken. 
• • • Defendant, • • • by failing to 
object at the time of the identification 
testimony, lost any right he might have 
pad to have that testimony stricken. 
Id. at 711. 
The rule followed in State v. Nevarez, supra, Foss 
v. State, supra, and State v. Lucero, supra, is designed to 
promote judicial efficiency by requiring timely objections at 
trial, and is directly applicable in the instant case. 
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to 
strike where appellant failed timely to object to Ms. 
Robinson's testimony was proper and consistent with State v. 
Mceardell, supra, wherein this Court expressed the importance 
of strict adherence to Utah's contemporaneous objection rule. 
In sum, appellant's failure to comport with the 
requirements of ~ 77-35-12 and his additional failure to 
interpose a timely objection to Ms. Robinson's identification 
-11-
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testimony at trial precludes consideration on appeal of 
appellant's assignment of error concerning the trial court's 
denial of his motion to strike that testimony. Accordingly, 
this Court should not proceed to decide that issue on the 
merits. As Justice Powell stated in Estelle v. Williams,· 425 
U.S. 501 (1976), 
[T]here are two situations in which a 
conviction should be ieft standing despite 
the claimed infringement of a 
constitutional right. The first situation 
arises when it can be shown that the 
substantive right in question was 
consensually relinquished. The other 
situation arises when a defendant has made 
an "inexcusable procedural default" in 
.failing to object at a time when a 
substantive right could have been 
protected. 
Id. at 513-514 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). 
Even if this Court decides to consider the motion to 
strike issue, appellant's assignment of error is without 
merit. The identification procedure employed in appellant's 
case was not "so imperrnissibly suggestive as to give rise to a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). In State 
• 
v. ·Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353 (1980), this Court said: 
Police identification procedures such 
as photograph displays, lineups, showups, 
and the like, do not deny the accused due 
process of law unless, under a totality of 
the circumstances,-_they are so 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
-12-
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irreparable mistaken identification as to 
deny the accused a fair trial. [Stovall 
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).] Where an 
identification procedure, even though 
suggestive, does not give rise to a 
s~·bstantial likelihood of misidentifica-
ti n, no due process violation has 
occurred. (Neil v. Biggers, 409 u.s. 188 
(1972).] In determ1n1ng the reliability 
of the identification under the totality 
of the circumstances, the court must also 
consider the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, the witness' degree of attention, 
the accuracy of any prior description of 
the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated during the identification 
procedure, and the time between the crime 
and the identification. [Neil v. Biggers, 
supra~ Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 u.s. 98 
(1977).] 
Id. at 357~ 
Acknowledging that the victim of an attempted rape 
a~ aggravated sexual assault "had a very limited opportunity 
to observe her assailant" in that "[h]er view of his face was 
very brief, and occurred in a darkened room immediately after 
she had been awakened from sleep," the Mccumber Court also 
said: 
Such factors, however, although they may 
weaken the probative impact of the 
evidence offered, do not mandate 
~uppression of the evidence in the name of 
due process without some showing that the 
identification procedures were themselves 
impermissibly suggestive. 
Id. at 357. 
-
Thus, even if, as ~ppellant contends, Ms. Robinson's 
identification of appellant was weak on two of the five Neil 
-13-
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v. Biggers factors (noted by this Court in the above quote 
from Mccumber), that does not mandate suppression of her 
testimony--although the probative impact of her testimony 
··dmittedly may be weakened. 
However, it should be noted that the validity of 
appellant's allegation that Ms. Robinson's identif~cation of 
appellant was very weak in two respects is suspect. Appellant 
contends that Ms. Robinson's prior description of appellant 
was not particularly accurate and that she was "not at all 
certain as to her identification, even after she viewed the 
appellant from a few feet away in a one-on-one show-up" 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 5). 
With respect to the prior description, appellant 
first asserts that Ms. Robinson was inaccurate in her 
estimation of appellant's weight1 yet no evidence was 
presented at trial establishing appellant's actual weight or 
that Robinson's estimate of 250-300 pounds was 100 pounds too 
heavy. Second, appellant notes that Robinson said her 
assailant was wearing a red T-shirt and that he wore his hair 
different than did appellant when viewed at the show-up. 
' • 
These differences do not amount to fatal inaccuracies1 they 
are easily explained: as noted by Ms. Robinson at trial, 
ap:pellant had chanqed his shirt and freshly combed his hair 
--
between the time of the attempted rape and the subsequent 
meeting of Robinson and appellant at the Diagnostic Center 
(see T. 26). 
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With respect to appellant's assertion that Ms. 
Robinson was not at all certain as to her identification of 
appellant, the record simply does not establish that this was 
so. In fact, the very opposite was true. Ms. Robinson 
positively identified appellant as her assailant after seeing 
and hearing him at the Diagnostic Center (see T. 26, 27, 28, 
48, 91). Appellant seems to suggest that Ms. Robinson's 
reliance on appellant's verbalization of the word "lady" in 
identifying appellant was somehow improper. Initially, it 
should be noted that appellant used the word "lady'' without 
any prompting from the police or Ms. Robinson (see T. 27, 91). 
The record· further indicates that Robinson's identification 
was based on both her visual and auditory observations. 
Reliance on the sound of the voice or the manner in which 
someone says a particular word as a factor in the identif i-
cation of an individual is a perfectly proper and often 
necessary means of making an identification. 
In short, appellant has not clearly shown that Ms. 
Robinson's identification of him was weak on any of the five 
factors outlined in Neil v. Biggers, supra. As noted earlier, 
even if it were assumed, arguendo, that the identification was 
somewhat weak on one or more of those points, that does not 
mandate suppression of the identification testimony. State v. 
Mccumber, supra. 
Finally, appellant argues that the show-up procedure 
used in his case was improper because it was highly suggestive 
-15-
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and ignored the line-up procedures provided for in Utah Code 
Ann., §§ 77-8-1 through 4 (1953), as amended. First, because 
appellant does not point to any specific conduct of the police 
at the show-up which rendered that procedure impermissibly 
suggestive, he appears to be suggesting that one-on-one 
showups are inherently suggestive and therefore violative of 
due process. However, he cites no authority in support of 
that proposition. In fact, this Court has repeatedly approved 
of the show-up as a proper identification prcoedure which is 
not impermissibly suggestive. In State v. Clemens, Utah, 580 
P.2d 601 (1978), the Court said: 
The idea of taking the victim 
forthwith to identify a suspect is of 
value to the detained person if he is 
innocent; and while the matter is fresh in 
mind, it assists the victim in determining 
whether a suspect is or is not the 
perpetrator of the offense. [See State v. 
Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 
(1969).] 
Id. at 602. See also: State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 511 
P.2d 159 (1973). 
Second, appellant's reliance on §~ 77-8-1 through 4 
is misplaced. Although those sections of the Code set out 
certain rules relating to line-ups, they do not prohibit 
police from conducting show-ups. This was recognized in State 
v. Allen, supra, at 160. Chapter 8 of Title 77 does not give 
a suspect the right to a li~e-up; it simply provides an 
alternative identification procedure for law enforcement 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
officers. In short, nothing in Utah's statutory law or case 
law indicates that police officers are required to use 
line-ups rather than show-ups, or that they must be confronted 
with exigent circumstances in order to use the show-up 
procedure. As noted in State v. Clemens, supra, and State v. 
Allen, supra, the show-up has distinct advantages which are 
necessary to continued effective enforcement of the criminal 
law. Thus, the decision to use the show-up procedure instead 
of a line-up in the instant case is not a basis for holding 
that the trial court improperly denied appellant's motion to 
strike Ms. Robinson's testimony. It should be emphasized that 
there was nothing in how the show-up was conducted which made 
it irnpennissihly suggestive. 
In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification procedures employed in this case were not 
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification," State v. Mccumber, supra, at 357: 
and, applying the Neil v. Biggers test, Ms. Robinson's 
identification testimony was highly reliable • 
• • POINT II 
THE EVIDRNCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT. 
In State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982), 
-
this Court set out the standard for reviewing an insufficiency 
of the evidence claim: 
-17-
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This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lRcking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 861 
(1981)1 State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 
(1980)1 State v. Garlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 
761 (1979)1 State v. Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 
811 (1977). We also view in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict those 
facts which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented to it. 
Id. at 945. 
Appellant's contention that the evidence was 
insuff icie~t to support the verdict in his case is based 
solely on the alleged unreliability of Ms. Robinson's 
testimony. However, that testimony was hardly unreliable. 
conceded by appellant, Ms. Robinson had an excellent 
opportunity to observe her assailant at close proximity in 
broad daylight1 her degree of attention could only have been 
very high given the nature of the crime (i.e., an attack on 
her person)1 and only a short time had elapsed between the 
attack and her identification of appellant as her assailant. 
As 
As'•respondent showed in Point I, appellant's contentions that 
Ms. Robinson gave an inconsistent prior de~cription of 
appellant and that she was uncertain of her identification of 
him at the show-up lack support in the record. 
Moreover, appellant's persistent assertion that 
eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliAble is not a 
(I 
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sufficient basis for overturning his conviction for lack of 
evidence. He cites no case law to support the position he is 
quite obviously arguing for--i.e., that the jury cannot 
reasonably rely on eyewitness identification testimony because 
it is inherently unreliable. Significantly, this Court 
implicitly recognized the value of that type of testimony in 
State v. Clemens, supra, and State v. Allen, supra, and, more 
recently, in State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), 
which held that the trial court's denial of expert testimony 
on the issue of the reliability of eyewitness testimony was 
not prejud~cial error, and that "[o]n the firm identification 
of the victim alone, it was reasonable for the jury to have 
found the defendant guilty [of sexually assaulting the 
victim]." Id. at 62. 
Finally, appellant completely ignores the testimony 
given at trial by Samuel Lee and Carlin Jacobson which 
identified appellant as Ms. Robinson's assailant. He also 
does not mention the photographic evidence introduced showing 
scratches on appellant's chin and chest which Ms. Robinson 
te~tified she inflicted on appellant during his attack on her. 
In short, the totality of the evidence, taken with 
the inferences the jury might reasonably draw therefrom, 
certainly is not so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not possibly have found appellant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ms. Robinson's positive 
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identification of appellant along with the strong 
corroborative evidence noted in the preceding paragraph is 
clearly a greater quantum of evidence than that found 
sufficient to support a similar conviction in State v. 
Malrnrose, supra. Accordingly, this Court should not interfere 
with the jury's verdict; appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, appellant's 
conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
1983. 
·Respectfully submitted this d /,,/-day of April, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
~~ 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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